Paying with Their Lives: The Status of Compensation for 9/11 Health Effects: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong., Apr. 1, 2008 (Statement of Kenneth Feinberg, Adjunct Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center) by Feinberg, Kenneth R
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2008
Paying with Their Lives: The Status of
Compensation for 9/11 Health Effects: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong., Apr. 1, 2008 (Statement of Kenneth
Feinberg, Adjunct Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center)
Kenneth R. Feinberg
Georgetown University Law Center
CIS-No.: 2008-H521-32
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/74
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong
Part of the Health Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Torts Commons
Testimony of Kenneth Feinberg 
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
Hearing: How To Improve Regulatory Accounting: Costs, Benefits and Impacts of Federal 
Regulations 
April 1, 2008 
Committee on House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 






My name is Kenneth R. Feinberg, and I served as the Special Master of the Federal September 
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. Appointed by the Attorney General of the United 
States, I was responsible for the design, implementation and administration of the 9/11 Fund. I 
served in that capacity for 33 months, until the Fund expired by statute on December 22, 2003. 
 
If statistics are any barometer of success, the 9/11 Fund served its purposes in providing an 
efficient and effective administrative no-fault alternative to tort litigation against alleged 
domestic tortfeasors. Over $7 billion in public taxpayer funds was paid to 5,560 eligible 
claimants. Families of 2,880 victims received $5,996,261,002.08 in compensation; in addition, 
2,680 physical injury victims were paid $1,053,154,534.56 by the 9/11 Fund. Some 97% of all 
eligible families who lost a loved one on September 11 voluntarily agreed to enter the 9/11 Fund 
rather than litigate. The average award for a death claim was $1,267,880.49; the average award 
for a physical injury claim was $392,968.11. And all of this was accomplished with 9/11 Fund 
administrative and overhead costs of less than 3%. I point with pride to the fact that this was one 
of the most efficient, streamlined and cost effective government programs in American history. 
 
It was also totally bipartisan. During the thirty-three months that I served as Special Master, I 
had the complete cooperation of the Department of Justice, Office of Management and Budget, 
the Administration, and the Congress. I also received unqualified support from various state and 
local governments, including, particularly, the City of New York and the Department of Defense. 
All government entities worked at my side to make sure that the 9/11 Fund was a success and 
that prompt payments were made to all eligible claimants. 
 
I also worked closely with Federal Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who continues to preside over all the 
federal 9/11 related cases in Manhattan. Judge Hellerstein worked tirelessly with me in 
coordinating the litigation and the 9/11 Fund claims in an effort to maximize the number of 
individuals who elected to enter the Fund rather than litigate. I am in his debt for his 
extraordinary work, then and now, in coming to the aid of families and victims in distress. 
 
When the Program expired, in December of 2003, only 94 lawsuits were filed by families of 
deceased victims who decided to litigate rather than enter the 9/11 Fund. It is my understanding 
that almost all of these wrongful death lawsuits have since been settled and that there are 
currently only a handful of cases still being litigated in federal court in Manhattan. 
 
The same cannot be said for the 9/11 physical injury victims, particularly the responders working 
after September 11 during rescue and clean-up operations at the World Trade Center. As already 
indicated, the 9/11 Fund paid over $1 billion to 2,680 eligible physical injury claimants. The vast 
majority of these physical injury victims were responders suffering various respiratory ailments 
at the World Trade Center site in the days, weeks and months following the September 11 
attacks. Almost all of these responders were compensated by the Fund for respiratory ailments 
rather than traumatic physical injuries. The 9/11 Fund eligibility criteria recognized that these 
respiratory ailments were often latent, that physical manifestations of injury often did not occur 
until months or years after first exposure to hazardous substances at the World Trade Center. 
That is why the 9/11 Fund modified its eligibility criteria to permit the valid filing of claims 
years after the terrorists attacks, when these physical manifestations first appeared and became 
apparent. 
 
However, as already indicated, the 9/11 Fund expired by statute on December 22, 2003, before 
thousands of responders, and possibly other individuals exposed to the toxic air at the World 
Trade Center site, manifested any physical injury. This large group of individuals could not be 
paid from the 9/11 Fund since there was no longer any Fund to process and pay their claims. 
Accordingly, they have exercised the alternative option of litigating before Judge Hellerstein. It 
is estimated that 11,000 responders will file suit by the end of this year, and that as many as an 
additional 29,000 individuals may yet manifest physical injuries in the next few years. It is 
anticipated that these affected individuals might file suit as well. 
 
I take no position on the merit of these lawsuits, which involve complex issues of liability, legal 
immunity of governmental entities, medical causation, and valuation of individual damage 
claims. But I do believe that these lawsuits should be resolved, that protracted and uncertain 
litigation is in nobody's interest. That is why the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund was 
established by Congress in the first place, a recognition that a prompt and efficient alternative to 
tort litigation constituted a better way. 
 
It is ironic that these very individuals who have filed lawsuits seeking compensation are the same 
type of individuals who received payments from the 9/11 Fund; had these thousands of 
individuals manifested a physical injury before the 9/11 Fund expired, they, too, would have 
received compensation without litigating. It is perfectly understandable, therefore, why they seek 
to be treated the same way and in the same manner as their brethren. It is my understanding that 
their decision to litigate is directly related to the fact that there is no longer a 9/11 Fund to 
process their physical injury claims. 
 
What should be done to resolve this problem, and the costly and uncertain litigation, and provide 
prompt compensation to eligible claimants physically injured in the aftermath of the September 
11 attacks? I offer two proposals for your consideration, both of them controversial and 
challenging and neither easy to achieve. But I believe that either of my proposals are preferable 
to the existing uncertainty and expense associated with the ongoing litigation. 
 
I. Renew and Extend the Federal September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
 
One option would be simply to reenact the law establishing the Federal September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund for an additional period of years in order to provide the same public 
compensation to eligible physical injury claimants. This could be justified on grounds of basic 
fairness; Congress would simply declare that the same eligibility criteria and compensation 
should be made available to those currently suffering respiratory injuries who were not paid by 
the earlier 9/11 Fund solely because they did not manifest a physical injury until after the earlier 
Fund had expired. Congress could simply reopen the 9/11 Fund to encompass all such claims 
during a "window" of five years during which time all September 11 related respiratory physical 
injuries could be evaluated and processed. (medical evidence would need to be considered by 
Congress in deciding how long this "window" would be open, permitting the filing of such 
physical injury claims). 
 
But one should not underestimate the philosophical, political, and practical problems associated 
with reenactment and extension of the 9/11 Fund. First, any attempt to reenact and extend the 
9/11 Fund should be initiated with the understanding that there would be no changes in the rules 
and regulations governing the original Fund, that the new law would simply be a "one line" 
reaffirmation of the law which established the original 9/11 Fund. This will not be easy. Various 
interested parties, while championing the reenactment of the 9/11 Fund, have called for statutory 
modifications and additions, e.g., indemnity protection for contractors at the World Trade Center 
site; compensation for claimants suffering mental trauma without accompanying physical injury; 
elimination of the collateral offsets rule which was an integral part of the original Fund; and 
subsequent Fund payments for eligible claimants who received compensation from the earlier 
Fund, but whose physical condition has subsequently worsened resulting in a demand for 
additional compensation. These and other well intentioned requests have all been asserted in 
connection with any attempt to reenact and extend the original 9/11 Fund. But I suggest that any 
attempt to modify the statutory provisions and accompanying regulations of the original Fund 
will lead to the type of controversy and disagreement that will undercut political consensus and 
prevent reenactment of the Fund. 
 
Second, even a "one line" extension of the original 9/11 Fund poses fundamental philosophical 
and political questions of fairness. Why should Congress be reenacting the 9/11 Fund, providing 
millions in additional public compensation to the physical injury victims of the September 11 
attacks, while no such Fund exists at all for the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, the 
victims of the African Embassy bombing, the victims of the first World Trade Center attack in 
1993 or, for that matter, the victims of the unprecedented disaster associated with Hurricane 
Katrina? Why should Congress, which has already enacted legislation authorizing over $7 billion 
in public compensation to the families of those who died on September 11, or who were 
physically injured as a result of the attacks, now authorize additional millions or even billions in 
compensation for the remaining September 11 victims, while failing to do anything similar to the 
other victims of life's misfortunes? It is a fundamental question posed to our elected officials in a 
free democratic society. Why some victims but not others? On what basis should such 
distinctions be made? Are some victims more "worthy" than others? 
 
I have maintained that the original 9/11 Fund was the correct response by the American people to 
the unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It was sound public policy, reflecting 
national solidarity towards the victims and expressing a national sense of compassion not only to 
the victims, but to the rest of the world. The September 11 statute was an expression of the best 
in the American character. It could be justified, not from the perspective of the victims, but, 
rather, from the perspective of the Nation. But whether or not it should be reenacted instead of 
being considered a unique singular response to an unprecedented national tragedy is a 
fundamental question better left to the consideration of Congress. 
 
II. Settlement of the Current and Future Physical Injury Litigation 
 
Even if Congress decides not to extend and reenact the 9/11 Fund, this does not mean that the 
current litigation should continue. Fortunately, there is a path open for the comprehensive 
resolution of the litigation, while protecting all defendants against the likelihood of similar future 
litigation. As I understand it, Congress created a September 11 related captive insurance 
company for the City of New York and its contractors in an amount approximating $1 billion. 
This money is readily available at the present time to resolve the physical injury claims currently 
pending in federal court against the City of New York, the contractors, and other defendant 
entities. Two problems have been raised, however, about the availability of these funds and the 
challenges posed in securing a comprehensive settlement of the litigation. 
 
First, is the obvious question as to whether or not the $1 billion is sufficient to resolve all of the 
pending claims? After all, it is noted, the 9/11 Fund paid over $1 billion in resolving just 2,680 
physical injury claims; how can $1 billion be sufficient to resolve some 11,000 current similar 
claims? A fair question. But there are answers. Nobody knows how many of the 11,000 pending 
claims are eligible for compensation, what the eligibility criteria might be, or what the 
compensation levels should be for valid physical injuries. In addition, how many of the existing 
plaintiffs are already receiving health related reimbursement? What role will collateral offsets 
play in any settlement negotiation? Most importantly, it is not clear to me that the $1 billion is 
the sole source of compensation in the event that a comprehensive settlement is sought. What 
about financial contributions over and above the $1 billion from other defendants and their 
insurers? If settlement negotiations do commence, to what extent is it possible and likely that all 
defendants, not just the City of New York and the captive insurer, will contribute settlement 
proceeds in an effort to secure "total peace" through a comprehensive resolution of the dispute? 
These are important questions that can only be answered in the context of meaningful settlement 
negotiations. 
 
Second, creative settlement terms and conditions can be negotiated which might provide 
additional financial security to eligible claimants over and above immediate compensation. For 
example, plaintiff attorneys involved in the litigation have been meeting with officials of the 
insurance industry to determine whether some type of individual insurance policy might be made 
available to each eligible plaintiff. Premiums would be paid from the captive insurance fund; in 
return, each eligible plaintiff would receive an insurance policy to be paid by the insurer if and 
when the individual plaintiff develops a future cancer or some other related illness. This 
approach, and other similar creative ideas, might be advanced during settlement negotiations to 
maximize financial protection for plaintiffs while taking advantage of relatively limited 
settlement dollars. 
 
Third, is the perplexing and legitimate problem of future physical manifestations resulting in 
additional litigation. I agree with the City of New York and other defendants that it makes little 
sense to settle all 11,000 current cases only to find that additional lawsuits are filed by future 
plaintiffs who do not manifest a physical injury until years after a current settlement. But, again, 
there are answers to this vexing problem which should help ameliorate defendant concerns. For 
example, it might be possible to set aside a portion of all available settlement proceeds, to be 
used if and when additional individual physical injury claims are presented for payment. 
Alternatively, it might be possible for all current eligible plaintiffs to be paid in installments, 
with additional funds due and owing depending upon the filing rate of future claims; this is 
exactly what Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein did in reorganizing the Manville Trust involving 
individual asbestos claims. A down payment was made, with future payments depending upon 
the filing rate of subsequent individual asbestos claims. Another idea is to provide some type of 
claims registry; an eligible individual exposed to toxic fumes at the World Trade Center, but not 
yet manifesting any physical injury on the date of the settlement, might receive a modest 
payment immediately and "register" for participation in the settlement. This potential future 
plaintiff would immediately receive the available insurance policy in addition to the modest 
down payment; in return, the individual would surrender all future rights to litigate. 
 
These are just some personal concepts which may be supplemented by other similar creative 
settlement terms and conditions. Some may work, others may not. What is important is that all 
interested parties come to the negotiation table with the flexibility, creativity, and determination 
to secure a comprehensive settlement. This approach is vastly preferable to the ongoing costly 
and uncertain litigation lottery. 
 
Mr. Chairman, I believe that either of the approaches which are the focus of my testimony today, 
are better alternatives than the existing litigation currently proceeding in federal court in New 
York City. Whether Congress decides to reenact the Federal September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, or whether it encourages all interested parties to commence intense 
negotiations designed to resolve all current and future September 11 related physical injury 
litigation, I am convinced that the courtroom is not the best place to resolve these disputes. I am 
prepared to assist the Congress and the parties in any manner requested, and to do so pro bono. 
What is important is that the litigation be brought to an end and that eligible claimants receive 
the compensation necessary to move on with their lives as best they can. We do not have the 
power to change history and prevent the September 11 terrorist attacks. But it is the 
responsibility of the Congress and the American people to try and bring some degree of financial 
security to the victims of September 11. I hope I have offered a blueprint and some food for 
thought to all interested parties. 
 
I thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. 
